



In immigration law and its administrative application, linedrawing
is a fact of life. Charged by Congress to administer the Immigration
and Nationality Act ["INA" or "the Act"],' the Attorney General
and his delegate, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
["INS" or "the Service"], would be unable to cope with the
caseload, given budget constraints, if each case required a full hear-
ing on the merits.2 Linedrawing works well in the thousands of rou-
tine cases in which the grant or denial of permanent or temporary
visas depends on the applicant's fulfillment of certain well-defined
criteria. Congress contemplates and accepts a few unfair results at
the administrative level as the price of a speedy and efficient adjudi-
cation of the overwhelming majority of cases. Even in these situa-
tions, though, it has provided for administrative and judicial redress
of most potential unfairness.
However, in the area of revocation of approved spousal petitions,
the situation is dramatically different. Here Congress grapples with
the troublesome situations in which a U.S. citizen who has married
an alien and petitioned for his or her immigrant visa either obtains a
divorce or "withdraws" the "approved spousal petition" before the
visa is granted.3 Congress has decided that the Attorney General
may "for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause," revoke
the approval of spousal petitions in such cases. Pursuant to this
congressional pronouncement, the Attorney General issued the au-
tomatic revocation regulations, which, in effect, determine that
there is "good and sufficient cause" to revoke an approved petition
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982) [herein-
after cited as INA].
2. In 1985, 361,039 immigrant visas and 5,793,343 non-immigrant visas were issued.
5 Bureau of Consular Affairs, No. 83, reprinted in Interpreter Releases 179-85 (Feb. 21,
1986). While the INS issued only about 15 percent of the immigrant visas directly, it
processed, investigated, and approved the petitions for most immigrant visas. In addi-
tion, the INS is in charge of processing and eventually deporting illegal aliens. In 1985
the INS apprehended 1.2 million illegal aliens, and presumably processed the majority
of them. "Startling" Surge Is Reported in Illegal Aliens from Mexico, New York Times, Feb.
21, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
3. An approved spousal petition is critical to the alien's ability to reside permanently
in the United States.
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in all cases of divorce or petition withdrawal. Since the Attorney
General's case-by-case discretion has been exhausted by the imple-
mentation of these regulations, no hearing need take place.
The INS takes the position that the regulations' denial of an ad-
ministrative forum is justified because it discourages fraudulent
spousal petitions. However, these regulations do not help achieve
the objective of deterring sham marriages. Rather, they abridge le-
gitimate statutory and common law rights and other important in-
terests of both citizens and aliens. As a result, when measured
against current legal tests, these regulations are an abuse of the At-
torney General's statutory discretion and an unwarranted denial of
due process both to the aliens and to the U.S. citizens involved. The
adoption of alternative administrative methods could correct these
infirmities while substantially serving the legitimate interest of the
INS in expeditious resolution of immigration cases. 4
II. Approved Petition Revocation: The Bureaucratic Scheme
A. The Issues at Stake
Consider the case ofJohn, a U.S. citizen, and Maria, a Costa Rican
citizen, who have been living together and decide to settle down and
raise a family in New York. They get married and have a baby. Pur-
suant to federal statutes and regulations, John files a petition with
the INS to accord Maria immigrant status as his spouse. Even
though the petition may be approved in a relatively short time, the
process is not yet complete. Following approval, the alien spouse
either "adjusts status ' ' 5 or applies for an immigrant visa at a United
States consulate abroad.6 If no other problem arises, a waiting pe-
riod of nine months to a year is not uncommon prior to the issuance
of the immigrant visa or "green card."7
4. Because this Comment concentrates on approved spousal petitions, it does not
reach larger immigration issues; in particular, it does not touch upon the Simpson-Maz-
zoli immigration bill or its amended version currently before Congress. Neither version
proposes changes in the approval revocation statute.
5. The INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1982), provides in part that "[t]he status of an alien
who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by
the Attorney General." In other words, the alien who meets the statutory criteria may
obtain an immigrant visa, popularly known as a "green card," in the United States and
be spared the inconvenience of having to apply for it at a consulate abroad.
6. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (1982), denies the § 1255(a) privilege of adjustment of
status in the United States to alien crewmen, to aliens who worked in the U.S. without
permission prior to the application for adjustment of status, and to aliens "in transit
without visa." By its own terms, § 1255(a) does not apply to an alien who entered with-
out inspection.




During this waiting period, John and Maria find that they have
irreconcilable differences and therefore divorce. The divorce order
awards Maria custody of their child while requiring John to pay ali-
mony and child maintenance. John also obtains certain rights to
visit and bring up the child. Because Maria and John have divorced,
the Service must revoke Maria's approved petition.8 She must leave
the country or be deported. Because she has custody rights, Maria
takes the child with her. John's visitation rights and duties to make
child maintenance and alimony payments under the divorce decree
become unenforceable, at least in practice.
In a slightly different scenario, John, in order to obtain a more
favorable decree, goes to the INS and properly withdraws his peti-
tion for adjustment of Maria's status before filing for divorce in state
court. Again, faced with the withdrawal of the petition, the Service
must revoke the prior approval.9 Maria must leave the country or be
deported. Maria's chances of successfully defending her rights in a
New York divorce proceeding from Costa Rica are slim at best. Af-
ter Maria is deported, nothing remains to stop John from obtaining
an uncontested divorce decree which will likely be more favorable to
him than any decree he could have obtained had his spouse been
able to contest the divorce.' 0 These scenarios, drawn from real
INS, 647 F.2d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 1981) (making reference to "the tortoise-like pace of
immigration proceedings"). This should not be taken as a blanket criticism. On occa-
sion, slowness in decision-making reflects seriousness and thoroughness in the Service's
investigations and performance of its other duties. On other occasions, in deference to
the citizen's and the alien's need, the Service stays the proceedings, and therefore de-
portation, awaiting a decision from the courts or the results of an investigation (e.g., in
political asylum cases the Department of State conducts an investigation and issues an
opinion to the INS).
8. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(4) (1986). This regulation provides for automatic revocation
of approved spousal petitions when divorce occurs.
9. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(1) (1986). This regulation provides for automatic revocation
of approved spousal petitions when the petition is withdrawn.
10. A citizen may find subtle uses for the immigration regulations, against which no
legal restraint is available. As a dissenting judge noted in an automatic revocation case,
"[tihere is evidence showing that the withdrawal of the visa petition by [the benefici-
ary's] wife was motivated by her desire to prevent [him] from interfering with an adulter-
ous affair...." United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy, 366 F.2d 266, 273-274 (2d Cir.
1966) (Moore, J., dissenting). In a slightly different context, the Ninth Circuit noted
that:
[m]arital difficulties that culminate in divorce are too common an occurrence not to
make one hesitate to accept the position of the INS. Moreover, the subtle but sig-
nificant influence that position would impart to the citizen or resident alien spouse
over the [beneficiary] also counsels hesitancy, although this reflects a concern that
may not be relevant to the purpose Congress sought to serve by enacting the
provision.
Kalezic v. INS, 647 F.2d at 922. It is also quite possible that the highly adversarial nature
of many dissolving marriages will result in the exploitation of the powerful advantage
which the citizen spouse enjoys over the alien spouse even before divorce proceedings.
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cases, dramatize the legal and policy shortcomings of the automatic
revocation regulations.
B. The Framework for Automatic Revocation
For an alien spouse (the "beneficiary") who seeks to obtain an
immigrant visa, the filing of a spousal petition is the first step. The
U.S.-citizen spouse (the "petitioner") files a petition formally re-
questing that the beneficiary be classified as having spousal status
for immigration purposes. Next, the Service approves or denies the
petition. Approval is granted when the INS is satisfied, usually after
thorough investigation, that the marital relationship did in fact exist
at the time of the filing. 1 Finally, with the approved petition, the
alien may obtain an immigrant visa.' 2
To regulate the period between the approval of the petition and
the obtaining of the visa, Congress enacted the Approval Revoca-
tion Statute, which reads in pertinent part:
The Attorney General may, at any time, for what he deems to be good
and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by
him [e.g., spousal petitions] .... 13
Under the authority of this statute, the Attorney General issued the
following regulations, known as the Automatic Revocation Regula-
tions, which read in part:
The approval of a petition. . . is revoked as of the date of approval if
: * , any of the following circumstances occur before the beneficiary's
journey to the United States commences or, if the beneficiary is an
applicant for adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident,
before the decision on his application becomes final:
The threat of a petition withdrawal may serve virtually to enslave the alien spouse to the
citizen spouse. Cf Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics
of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168 (1984) (analyzing potential for fathers in child
custody cases to use the threat of obtaining custody of the children as a "bargaining
chip" in financial negotiations).
11. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1982). See generally Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604
(1953); Matter of Phillis, 15 I. & N. Dec. 385 (1975).
12. An alien may become a permanent resident in one of two ways, depending on
the circumstances. He or she either "adjusts status" without leaving the U.S., or applies
for an immigrant visa in a U.S. consulate abroad.
13. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1982). The remainder of the statute reads:
Such revocation shall be effective as of the date of approval of any such petition. In
no case, however, shall such revocation have effect unless there is mailed to the
petitioner's last known address a notice of the revocation and unless notice of the
revocation is communicated through the Secretary of State to the beneficiary of the
petition before such beneficiary commences his journey to the United States. If
notice of revocation is not so given and the beneficiary applies for admission to the
United States, his admissibility shall be determined in the manner provided for by






(1) Upon written notice of withdrawal filed by the petitioner with any
officer of the Service who is authorized to grant or deny petitions
(4) Upon the legal termination of the relationship of husband and wife
when a petition has accorded status as the spouse of a citizen or lawful
resident alien .... 14
By promulgating these automatic regulations, the Attorney Gen-
eral has effectively decided that there is "good and sufficient cause"
to revoke an approved petition in every case of petition withdrawal
or divorce. It follows that a hearing prior to revocation is never nec-
essary: no person ever has the opportunity to show that his or her
case falls short of the statutory "good and sufficient" criterion. In
constitutional terms, the denial of a hearing even in certain cases
where there is no "good and sufficient cause" to revoke is nonethe-
less tolerated because the governmental interest - the concern with
sham marriages - outweighs the parties' interests. The courts of
appeals of three circuits have found the regulations acceptable, at
least in the case of withdrawal of approved petitions.' 5 However,
the judicial decisions were mistaken in favoring the governmental
interest over the individual rights because the governmental con-
cern with sham marriages, although legitimate, is of little or no rele-
vance at the approved-petition stage.
III. Judicial Confusion and Its Effect on Family Law Obligations
The courts usually accord deference to the regulatory practices of
the administrative agency charged by Congress to deal with a spe-
cific area. Immigration regulations are no exception; they receive
extreme deference from the courts. However, with respect to the
automatic revocation regulations, the courts have gone beyond def-
erence. They have misunderstood the regulations and miscon-
strued the statute. In the process they have thwarted both state
family law and important policies incorporated into other state and
federal statutes.
14. 8 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(a)(1),(4) (1986). Their predecessors, 8 C.F.R. §§ 206.1(b)(1),
(4), were substantially similar.
15. Wright v. INS, 379 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928 (1967);
United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy, 366 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated, 388 U.S.
462 (1967); Pacheco Pereira v. INS, 342 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1965) (dictum).
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A. Judicial Confusion of the Regulations' Scope
There are few judicial decisions addressing the automatic revoca-
tion regulations,' 6 and most of them have confused rather than clar-
ified the issues involved. In Pacheco Pereira v. INS, 17 the wife (a U.S.
citizen) requested that her spousal petition be withdrawn before the
Service had acted upon it. The husband challenged the subsequent
deportation order, but the federal court upheld the Service's deci-
sion. At that stage, as there was no petition to consider, there was
nothing for the Service to approve or reject.1 8 The automatic revo-
cation regulation, therefore, was utterly irrelevant in this case pre-
cisely because there had been no approval to begin with.
The Pacheco Pereira court could have upheld the Service's deporta-
tion order simply on the basis of the lack of a petition. After noting
that "before the Service had acted on her petition for change in her
husband's status, the wife requested that it be withdrawn," and that
"[t]he Service acceded,"' 19 the court needed to go no further since
there was no petition to act on. However, the court continued its
misguided search and noted that "[e]ven after approval of a section
1155 petition the Attorney General could revoke the approval, ter-
minating the alien spouse's eligibility . . . . Under the applicable
regulation this revocation is automatic if the citizen spouse requests
16. The INS does not publish statistics of how many people are deported as a result
of the application of § 205.1(a)(1) and § 205.1(a)(4). Thus it is difficult to determine
whether the dearth of case law is due to the lack of petition withdrawal and divorce
cases, or to some other reason. That there are so few judicial decisions is probably the
result of several factors, of which the following three appear to be the most important.
First, federal litigation is expensive. Because deportation is not a criminal proceeding,
the respondent therein is not entitled to counsel at the government's expense. Second,
federal litigation is lengthy. Because automatic stay of deportation may be unavailable,
the alien may be deported at the end of the administrative appeal process. When a
person is deported, the deportation proceeding is finished and, in most situations, the
challenge in federal court becomes moot. Third, the case may become moot if the immi-
gration situation is resolved in some other way, for instance if the alien becomes ineligi-
ble for some form of statutory relief or for a visa on a different basis.
17. 342 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1965).
18. The U.S. citizen's petition starts the process. It is the alien spouse's relationship
to him or her that confers the immigration benefit sought. When the petitioner dies or
withdraws the petition before INS approval, the petition dies. In other words, the alien
loses all possible benefits that he or she would have derived. This drastic measure is
appropriate in the pre-approval period for two reasons. First, there is a relatively short
period between filing and approval. The risk of disrupting deeply-established family
relations is relatively low. Second, none of the anti-marriage-fraud safeguards inherent
in the approval process has been applied. Therefore, the government's interest in an
expeditious resolution is at its peak while the alien's equities have yet to arise. On this
basis, the courts have held that the filing of a petition confers no vested right on the
alien spouse. Once approved, the petition merely renders him or her eligible for immi-
grant status. See generally Amarante v. Rosenburg, 326 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1964).




the withdrawal." 20 In an ironic twist, the court went on to chastise
the INS counsel: "We must say that it is not clear to us why this
determinative regulation was never mentioned until oral argument
in this court." 2' In fact, the INS counsel was correct in not briefing
a regulation that did not bear on the issue. Unfortunately, this
court's confusion in the difficult area of spousal petitions is not an
isolated incident. Although the confusion did not prejudice the re-
sult in that case, the holding has since been cited as precedent in
cases where a petition has been approved and the regulation did not
apply. 22 The Pacheco Pereira court thus helped to legitimize a regula-
tion it should never have addressed.
B. Effects of the Regulations on the Citizen-Alien Family
Even those courts that have correctly understood when the regu-
lations do and do not apply have failed to consider the regulations'
impingement on the protected interests of all members of affected
families. An example of the automatic revocation regulations'
thwarting of state family law is Scalzo v. Hurney.23 In September of
1958, an Italian citizen married Mr. Scalzo, a U.S. citizen, and they
settled in Philadelphia. In less than two months the petition to
classify her status as his wife was approved. Later, marital discord
arose. Pursuant to Mr. Scalzo's withdrawal of his petition, the Ser-
vice revoked the approved petition in May of 1959.24 In an unpub-
lished opinion, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
ordered him to reinstate the application for his wife's adjustment of
status.25 Although the INS record contained contradictory evi-
dence, there is little doubt that the Pennsylvania court ordered Mr.
Scalzo to reinstate the visa petition for his wife to ensure compliance
with the court's eventual alimony payment orders. Perceiving the
possibility that Mr. Scalzo would use his wife's deportation to his
own advantage, the state court acted to foil his attempt to use INS
procedures to escape his obligations under Pennsylvania family law.
Nevertheless, the INS denied the reinstated petition, rejected re-
lated efforts by Mrs. Scalzo, and ordered her deportation.
The federal district court in Scalzo found that the purpose of INA
20. Id. (citing INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1156 and 8 C.F.R. § 206.1(b)(1)).
21. Id.
22. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
23. 225 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
24. See id. at 561.
25. See id.
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§ 20626 is "to keep families together," and held that "[o]nce that
purpose is no longer to be served, it would seem that cause for revo-
cation of an approval previously granted is established.- 27 In this
way, the court avoided considering the difficult question that Mrs.
Scalzo had raised of whether the Attorney General had abused his
discretion or acted unconstitutionally in deciding that there was
"good and sufficient cause" to revoke the approval in her case with-
out hearing the particular facts. 28 Finally, with no legal hurdle left
to obstruct the decision of the issue as earlier framed by the court of
appeals, 29 the district court summarily held that Mrs. Scalzo had ac-
quired no vested right in the petition approval,30 thus clearing the
way for her deportation. The problem with the Scalzo case is not its
result so much as its failure to scrutinize the automatic-revocation
scheme. As a result of this failure, a citizen was allowed to dodge
state family law obligations without even the hindrance of a hearing
on the issue.
26. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1156 (1965), forerunner of the current revocation statute, INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1982).
27. 225 F. Supp. at 561. This holding, however, reflects an unsubstantiated and un-
justified logical leap. Divorce does not mean that the purpose of the statute is no longer
to be served by allowing the alien spouse to remain in the country. The Scalzo court may
have been influenced by the traditional notion that in ending the bonds of matrimony, a
divorce terminates all family relationships. This is not necessarily so. For example, a
family whose members live in the same city or within commuting distance is functionally
united but not "together." A divorce decree will change the legal obligations and rights
of the family members, but father, mother, and child may live in proximity so that both
parents may attend to the child's rearing. Deportation of one of the parents may make it
impossible for the deported parent to do so. The implied conceptual distinction has not
escaped judicial notice: "the mere unexplained desire of one spouse to rid herself of the
other cannot be deemed per se sufficient cause to disrupt the unit, particularly where
• ..there are minor children involved." United states ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy, 366 F.2d
266, 273 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J., dissenting).
28. The federal judge's conclusion is a particularly unjustified logical leap in this
case, since the state court had made clear Pennsylvania's interest in keeping Mrs. Scalzo
in the country. There is no doubt that Congress has absolute authority in immigration
matters. See generally Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Wong Hing Fun v.
Esperdy, 335 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom. Ng Sui Sang v. Esperdy, 379
U.S. 970 (1965). Thus the state is preempted when immigration matters are at stake.
However, the issue here is not one of application of the immigration statute but one of
whether or not the purpose of the Act is served by the questioned regulation, that is,
whether a hearing or merely an automatic scheme is what the statute and the Constitu-
tion require. Under these circumstances, it is not clear whether the federal judge, or as
here the federal executive, has jurisdiction to reverse the state's determination. See Erie
Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its teachings.
29. Although Mrs. Scalzo filed her suit in district court, it was transferred to the
court of appeals on the theory that she was contesting the deportation order. However,
the court of appeals found that Mrs. Scalzo was contesting her deportation order only
insofar as she sought review of the denial of the petition to adjust her status. It found
this question collateral to the deportation issue, and held that jurisdiction rested solely
in the district court. 314 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1963).




A richer, more complex example of the effects of the regulations
is found in United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy. 3 i After marriage, Mrs.
Stellas, a U.S. citizen, filed a petition for her husband, a Greek citi-
zen, which was approved in August of 1963. Mr. Stellas - busy
making a living for himself and his family - never went to a U.S.
consulate to obtain his permanent visa. 32 By November of 1965 Mr.
and Mrs. Stellas had two U.S.-citizen children. Apparently Mrs.
Stellas began an extra-marital relationship at about that time and
became afraid that her husband would beat her. Instead of seeking
a divorce or police protection from her husband, Mrs. Stellas ad-
vised the INS that she wished to withdraw the approved petition "al-
leging that she was in fear of bodily harm." 33 Accordingly, the INS
automatically revoked the petition approval. The Second Circuit
felt itself constrained by the automatic nature of the regulations and
affirmed the INS's revocation of the approval.3 4 On appeal, in a per
curiam order, the Supreme Court summarily vacated the judgment
and ordered the INS to continue processing Mr. Stellas' visa.35
While the Court did not give any reason for its decision, its disposi-
tion demonstrated that it would not allow the Executive's regulation
to create an inequitable result.
A deficiency of the regulations that is even more glaring than their
lack of concern for the alien spouse is their wholesale disregard for
children's interests. Neither the regulations nor interpreting courts
have recognized that U.S.-citizen children, born in a citizen-alien
family, have a strong interest in the outcome of the revocation pro-
cess. In most immigration cases, the interests of the child and the
parents coincide; all members of the family are better off if the alien
parent obtains the visa.3 6 The problem comes when the interests of
the child conflict with the interests of one of the parents, for neither
the INA nor the regulations allow for third party intervention.
Attempts to intervene by U.S.-citizen children have been
unsuccessful.
3 7
31. 366 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1966).
32. Id. at 268.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 270.
35. United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy, 388 U.S. 462 (1967).
36. The case in which the interests of all the family members coincide is the typical
case envisioned by the Act. Thus, usually there is no prejudice from refusing to allow
the intervention of the child. This is important for the INS because it helps achieve
expeditious disposition of cases.
37. See, e.g., Agosto v. Boyd, 443 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1971) (intervention attempted by
both children and mother); Application of Amoury, 307 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
The courts have rationalized the denial of intervention on the basis that although people
487
Yale Law & Policy Review
This denial of intervention rights makes the fact pattern in the
Stellas case all too common. Mrs. Stellas wants to withdraw the peti-
tion and have her husband deported. In this way, she can keep her
lover and the children without going through full divorce proceed-
ings in family court. The children, on the other hand, are probably
better off if they can keep their father in the United States because
this will give them a better chance of receiving full parental nurtur-
ing as well as full child support.3 8 Further, the state will also benefit
for the related reason that the children will be less likely to end up
as public charges.3 9 At present, however, only the citizen spouse,
and not the children, has the right to petition for the alien spouse
40
and to withdraw the petition. It is exactly in this context - where a
hearing would be most useful to preserve the children's interests -
that the regulations deny a hearing altogether. Thus, the interests
of the children may go completely unattended.
4'
Had Mrs. Stellas been successful in having her husband automati-
cally deported by petition withdrawal, she would have been able to
born in the U.S. have a right to choice of residence, the government has no obligation to
help them remain in their country of birth and "in the case of an infant below the age of
discretion the right is purely theoretical . . . since the infant is incapable of exercising
it." Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1984), citing Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d
1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1977). While it may be true that the infant is incapable of exercising
the right of choice the INS has recognized that a guardian may be appointed. Matter of
McQuaid, 15 I. & N. Dec. 582 (1976). But cf. Encisco-Cardozo v. INS, 504 F.2d 1252 (2d
Cir. 1974). The Encisco-Cardozo court left open the possibility that under the appropriate
circumstances it would recognize the right of the child to intervene. The court denied
intervention because it found that the mother was capable of raising all the appropriate
issues to safeguard the child's interests.
38. A divorce proceeding takes place in state court and, if the father is the main
provider, he will probably have to pay child support. There is a better chance that the
child will get these payments if the father is in the U.S. rather than abroad. First, the
father's earnings will probably be greater in the U.S. than abroad. Second, the court
order has a better possibility of enforcement if the father is in the U.S. For new efforts
to enforce child support payments, see Lieberman, Time to Get Tough on Child Support
Payments, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 27, col. 2.
39. If the father is the provider, the government has a strong interest in the matter,
that of keeping the children from becoming public charges. Id. Though the single
mother can provide support in many cases, the statistical odds are in favor of a decrease
in the children's standard of living. See Neely, supra note 10, at 179.
40. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(40)(b)(1) (1982) (a child under 21 may not petition for his
parent).
41. In most other instances, such as exclusion or deportation, the regulations pro-
vide for a hearing. Even though the children are not formal parties to those hearings,
immigration judges and hearing officers routinely consider the potential hardships for
them. Typical examples of this concern are found in the area of suspension of deporta-
tion cases, INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982). See, e.g., Ramos v. INS, 695 F.2d 181, 186
(5th Cir. 1983) (close family ties, particularly the effect on grade-school-age children,
must be considered); Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally





avoid the prospect of a less favorable divorce judgment in a state
court family law proceeding. In other words, the automatic revoca-
tion regulations have the potential effect of vitiating the state family
law process. Had this happened, the Stellas' two U.S.-citizen chil-
dren would have been deprived of state family law rights without
any chance to advance their interests before a state court or the
INS. 42 Their rights to parental maintenance and their interest in a
two-parent upbringing (even where the parents are separated)
43
might have been extinguished without any consideration. In the
typical state family court setting, as opposed to the automatic INS
scheme, the judge carefully considers all matters relating to the chil-
dren on the basis of "the best interest of the child" standard.44 The
INS regulations fail to address, let alone resolve, their potential for
ignoring the citizen children's interests.
Permutations of the Stellas example result in similar and equally
unfair outcomes. A citizen husband can safely ignore court orders
requiring payments of alimony and child support when the divorce
from, and resulting deportation of, his wife effectively prevents her
from enforcing the divorce judgment. A different but equally com-
mon permutation occurs when the citizen father wishes to continue
his relationship with his children. If the mother gains custody of the
children and is deported, the citizen father will be effectively de-
prived of the right to visit and raise his citizen children. 45 The stat-
ute, with its avowed purpose of "keeping families of United States
citizens and immigrants united," 46 does not contemplate these un-
fair results.
47
42. State law routinely recognizes the parents' obligations to support and discipline
their children. The child's right is so strong that mere disobedience or even delin-
quency does not terminate the parental duty of maintenance. But see Roe v. Doe, 29
N.Y.2d 188, 193, 328 N.Y.S.2d 506, 68 Misc. 2d 833 (1971) (recognizing this principle,
but reaching a contrary holding on the facts).
43. This is an interest shared by a large and growing number of U.S.-citizen
children.
44. See Neely, supra note 10, at 170 n.5.
45. The father's right to participate in decisions concerning his children and their
upbringing is of constitutional dimension and has even been extended to unwed fathers.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652
(1975) ("a father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally protected right to the
'companionship, care, custody, and management' of 'the children he has sired and
raised ... ,' " citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651.)
46. INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 220 (1966).
47. In fact a separation or divorce of the parents does not terminate the family rela-
tionship altogether. A divorce proceeding is designed to dissolve the marriage and de-
termine the duties and rights of the parties to the family unit after the divorce takes
place.
489
Yale Law & Policy Review
IV. Constitutional and Statutory Shortcomings
Like other administrative agencies, the INS works on a con-
strained budget. The Service justifies the automatic revocation reg-
ulations on the basis that they are the most efficient way to deal with
the problem of sham marriages during the period between approval
and visa issuance. In fact, the regulations are of little use in deter-
ring the perceived evil. Moreover, they provide neither the minimal
due process to which aliens are entitled, nor the full due process to
which citizens are entitled. Because they fail to advance their prof-
fered objective while impinging on important individual rights and
interests, the regulations fail to pass constitutional muster. Further,
the regulations cannot stand because they represent an abuse of the
discretion that the approval revocation statute confers on the Attor-
ney General.
The Supreme Court has established that aliens do enjoy due pro-
cess rights, at least under certain circumstances. A distinction must
be made between exclusion and deportation proceedings. An alien
is subject to exclusion proceedings if he has not "entered" the
United States, and to deportation if he has made an "entry. '48 The
courts have held that aliens in exclusion proceedings generally have
only statutorily created, and no constitutionally mandated, rights.49
Due process rights are no exception. 50 However, in the case of de-
48. See Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) (explaining distinction between
deportation and exclusion hearings). "Entry" is a term of art in immigration law. While
it is defined in the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13) (1982), its meaning is still hotly debated
and unsettled. See, e.g., INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 193-194 (1984), and cases cited
therein. In general a person who comes into the country with a visitor visa and over-
stays, or even a person who comes in evading border inspections has "entered." On the
other hand, a crewman, a stowaway or a person who is "paroled" in (i.e. stopped at the
border and allowed in to appear in front of an immigration judge), even if a permanent
resident, has not "entered."
49. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (citing Knauffv. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950), for the proposition that "whatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."). An alien
abroad is not a "person" for the purposes of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The
same analysis applies to an individual who has not made an "entry." United States v.Ju
Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905). Exclusion without a hearing is not unconstitutional.
Wong Hing Fun v. Esperdy, 335 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom. Ng Sui Sang
v. Esperdy, 379 U.S. 970 (1965). Cf Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) (exclusion
based on warrant issued more than five years after entry upheld because fifth amend-
ment due process inapplicable).
50. See generally Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). Currently, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(1982) provides for some form of hearing in most exclusion cases, with appeal
to the Attorney General, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b), and ultimately judicial review by way of
habeas corpus, 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(6). Stowaways, however, are denied a hearing in





portation proceedings, the Supreme Court has held that some con-
stitutional safeguards, including due process, apply. 5' Because the
automatic revocation regulations operate on an individual regard-
less of whether he is in deportation or exclusion proceedings, they
are not immune to a due process challenge.
A. The Sham Marriage Rationale and the Rational Relation Test
The Service's main concern is with the large and growing number
of fraudulent or sham marriages, 52 which are defined as marriages
entered into for the primary purpose of circumventing the immigra-
tion laws. Fear of encouraging further fraud in the area of marital
petitions leads the Service to retain and enforce the automatic revo-
cation regulations. 53 However, no matter how serious the problem
with fraudulent marriages54 - and the potential seriousness of the
problem should by no means be ignored - the automatic revoca-
tion regulations are neither reasonably nor rationally related to the
proffered objective of curtailing the incidence of such marriages.
55
51. Most procedural safeguards in deportation proceedings are now codified, INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982 & Supp. I 1986). However, because deportation has been held
to be a civil and not a criminal proceeding, the guarantees of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and
eighth amendments and the ex post facto clause of article I, § 9 of the Constitution as
applied in criminal settings do not necessarily apply in deportation proceedings. See
generally INS. v. Lopez Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984) (the exclusionary rule does not
apply in a deportation proceeding).
52. The belief that this is the case is widely shared by members of the immigration
bar. In his response to a proposal for change in the automatic revocation regulations,
Warren Leiden, Executive Director of the American Immigration Lawyers Association,
noted: "Regretfully, I fear your proposal [to modify the automatic revocation regula-
tions] will encounter strong opposition, given the Service's present attitude toward
spousal petitions and marriage fraud." Letter from Warren Leiden, Executive Director
of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, to David Scheinfeld (Sept. 10, 1985)
(on file with the YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW). Mr. Leiden's observation about the Ser-
vice's present attitude is correct.
53. In his letter to David Scheinfeld, R. Michael Miller, the INS officer responsible
for automatic revocations, stated: "Unfortunately, because of the ease in immigrating
through marriage, the number of fraudulent or sham marriages has increased tremen-
dously. I fear that if we attempted to regulate your proposed revision [to 8 C.F.R.
§ 205.1(a)] we would be encouraging fraud in an area that already has enough
problems." Letter from R. Michael Miller, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Adjudica-
tions, to David Scheinfeld (Oct. 11, 1985) (on file with the YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW).
54. For example, Congress, also concerned with this problem, enacted the so-called
"gigolo" statute, INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c)(1), which provides that if the marriage was
entered into less than two years prior to issuance of the visa, and its dissolution takes
place within two years of such issuance, the alien has the burden of proving that the
marriage was entered into for bona fide purposes.
55. The reasonable or rational relation test is usually used by the courts to review
administrative rulemaking. Depending on the language of the statute against which the
regulation is judged, the courts use the terms "unreasonable," "irrational," "arbitrary
and capricious," "contrary to law," and others to refer to a regulation that cannot stand.
See J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 319-342 (1985), and cases cited
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The sham marriage is not new. Years of experience with it have
prompted the Service to establish an elaborate system of interviews
and investigations designed to detect and deny petitions based on
sham marriages. Before approval, spousal petitions are routinely
subjected to intense scrutiny. 56 The Service's approval of a petition
takes place only after the INS officer is convinced that there is no
reason to doubt the validity of the marital relationship. If reason for
doubt exists, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the mar-
riage is not a sham. 57 A finding of fraudulent or sham marriage
leads to denial of the petition. 58 Stiff penalties may attach. The
alien may be deported and barred from future admission. 59 In some
cases, the citizen or resident involved is also subject to criminal
penalties .60
The automatic revocation regulations apply only to approved pe-
titions. These are cases in which the Service has already thoroughly
therein. Judges use the standards which accord with the relevant statutory language but
the intensity of scrutiny is the same under any of them. See, e.g., National Tire Dealers &
Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (concepts of "rational rela-
tion," "remote relation," and "significant nexus" used interchangeably in opinion strik-
ing down an agency standard requiring permanent labeling on retreaded tires). See
generally Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 899, 934 (1973). On the other hand, some commentators believe that the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard of § 706(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 551 et seq., generally used for informal rulemaking review, is less exacting than
the "substantial evidence" standard of Section 706(E) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, generally used for individual adjudication review. See MASHAW & MERRILL, supra
note 55, at 333.
56. An elaborate interview by an immigration officer takes place before the petition
is approved or rejected. In the New York District of the INS, the interview process has
been highly formalized. See Stikes v INS, 393 F. Supp. 24, 30-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(describing investigative procedures of the INS in sham marriage cases). For example,
in New York City, where Stikes controls, the INS officer interrogates the husband and the
wife separately as to their experiences and life in common to find inconsistencies. It is
this author's experience that the Service denies a petition if there are three or four in-
consistent answers out of forty or fifty questions, even if all the other evidence supports
the conclusion that the marriage is not a sham. Personal investigation at the marital
abode and interviews with neighbors are other common techniques.
57. Matter of Phillis, 15 I. & N. Dec. 385 (1975). Indeed, the petitioner always has
the burden of establishing elegibility for the benefits sought. Matter of Brantigan, 11
I. & N. Dec. 493 (1966).
58. Matter of M., 8 I. & N. Dec. 217 (1958); See generally Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604 (1953); Johl v. United States, 370 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1966); Matter of McKee,
17 I. & N. Dec. 332 (1980).
59. INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 182(a)(16), (17), (19)(1982 & Supp. 11 1986) (deported aliens,
arrested and deported aliens, and aliens who committed fraud are ineligible to receive
visas and excludable), and INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c)(1)(1982) (the "gigolo" statute).
Under certain circumstances, waiver of excludability grounds and relief from deporta-
tion are available. INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(c), 1251(f).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (broad prohibition against falsification to the government).
This statute has been used to prosecute both parties to a sham marriage. See, e.g.,




checked for fraud and found none to exist. In effect, in all the cases
covered by the automatic revocation regulations, the Service has al-
ready established to its satisfaction that the underlying marriage is
not a sham.6 ' This crucial fact brings into focus both the statutory
and constitutional weaknesses of the regulatory scheme. First,
whether or not the approval revocation statute was enacted to vest
the Attorney General with discretion to withhold revocation in those
cases where there is "good and sufficient cause," 62 the Attorney
General's refusal to find good and sufficient cause in those admit-
tedly non-sham cases is an abuse of that discretion. Second, when
the Attorney General automatically revokes petitions without a hear-
ing to the purported end of preventing sham marriages, he acts
without rational or reasonable basis.
B. Abuse of Discretion
There is no doubt that the Service has very broad discretion in
applying the Act. 63 To address the myriad of regulatory problems
which it faces, the Service may resort to two different types of deci-
sion-making: adjudication (decision on a case-by-case basis) or
rulemaking (decisions for groups or classes of cases). Different
standards of judicial review are prescribed by Congress for each
type of decision-making, and in reviewing agency rulemaking the
courts follow these standards. 64 The courts will uphold a regulation
promulgated by the INS unless there is an affirmative showing that
61. As has been recognized by the courts and the INS, the central question in these
proceedings is whether the bride and groom intended to establish a life together at the
time they were married. Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975); Matter of McKee,
17 I. & N. Dec 332.
62. As the Second Circuit noted in discussing INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1155, "[tlhe purpose
of placing such [statutory] discretion regarding immigration in the hands of the Attor-
ney General, rather than having that field governed by a detailed statute, is to give some
flexibility in treating a myriad of possible situations." Pierna v. INS, 397 F.2d at 951.
63. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977) ("'[o]ur cases have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a
fundamental sovereign attribute excercised by the Government's political departments
largely immune from judicial control,' " citing Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953)). See generally Yuk-Ling Wu Jew v. Attorney General, 524 F. Supp. 1258, 1260
(D.D.C. 1981).
64. See supra note 55. For example, Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., concerning judicial review, mandates that "the reviewing court
shall - (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be - (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law. . . (E) unsupported by substantial evidence. . . or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute." Some commentators discern a trend
toward more exacting judicial scrutiny of the substantive basis for administrative rules.
MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 55, at 342.
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it is unreasonable or contrary to legislative intent.65 Applying this
standard in Mak v. INS,66 the Second Circuit held that it would not
disturb the Attorney General's decision by regulation "if his deter-
mination is founded on considerations rationally related to the stat-
ute he is administering.
' 67
In Mak, an alien who had been granted permission to travel
through the United States but had remained illegally in the country
sought adjustment of his status. The relevant regulation denied the
exercise of visa eligibility and deportation review rights to all aliens
who had been admitted for purposes of "lawful transit only." The
regulation was upheld because the court was convinced that "one
paramount element [of the class being regulated] create[d] such
'likeness' [of each class member to each of the other class members]
that other elements [could] not be so legally significant as to warrant
a difference in treatment. ' 68 The Mak court's treatment of regula-
tion review finds support in the Supreme Court's earlier treatment
of a similar immigration regulation in Carlson v. Landon.69 There,
the Court held that the Attorney General's bail-setting discretion
under the Internal Security Act was broad enough to justify a regu-
lation providing for the offenders' detention without bail. In justify-
ing the exercise of the Attorney General's discretion by regulation,
the Court observed that there had been individualized findings of
"membership plus personal activity in supporting and extending the
[Communist] Party's philosophy concerning violence." 70 Thus, the
Carlson court upheld the application of the regulation to the case
before it only after becoming convinced that the application had
been triggered by individualized findings of a single paramount ele-
ment which warranted like treatment of all cases. On the basis of
Carlson, the Ninth Circuit in National Center for Immigration Rights v.
INS concluded that "[t]he discretion of the Attorney General to im-
pose a condition on a particularized showing in an individual case is
quite different from the authority to do so by a blanket rule."'
T
65. Nazareno v. Attorney General, 512 F.2d 936, 939-941, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832
(1975). The presumption of reasonableness applies whether the Service's interpretation
takes place on a case-by-case basis or by regulation. United States ex rel. Stellas v. Es-
perdy, 388 U.S. 462, and cases cited therein.
66. 435 F.2d 728, 730 (2d Cir. 1970).
67. Id
68. Id.
69. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
70. Id. at 541.
71. National Center For Immigration Rights, Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.
1984). The court of appeals quoted Justice Frankfurter's observation:




Applying the elements of the Mak test, approvingly used by the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit in other immigration contexts,
the courts will legitimate agency decisions by regulation only after
scrutinizing each case to make sure that the regulation denying a
hearing is in fact based on "one paramount element," and that the
case at bar bears sufficient "likeness" to the rest of the regulated
class. If the regulation fails this test, it is struck down as "arbitrary
and capricious" or as an "abuse of discretion."
72
The automatic revocation regulations fail Mak's "one paramount
element" test both for petition withdrawal and divorce cases. First,
the situations in which a spouse may wish to withdraw the petition
are so varied that there is no "one paramount element" creating
enough "likeness" to justify treating all withdrawal cases alike.
While some spouses may withdraw a petition for the good reason
that they no longer intend to maintain their family unit, others may
file their withdrawals to obtain undue advantages in their subse-
quent divorce proceedings and settlements. Where there are at
least these two clearly defined sets of spouses withdrawing petitions,
there can be no "one paramount element" which warrants like treat-
ment of both sets. As for divorces, while some legal terminations of
marriages also terminate family obligations, others do no more than
redefine them. The ex-spouses continue to be bound by the orders
in the divorce decree. Children still need economic and emotional
support after the divorce. Again, the variety of family arrangements
in the wake of divorce defies identical treatment of all divorce situa-
tions. Therefore, neither the withdrawal nor the divorce situations
present sufficient internal "likeness" to meet the "one paramount
element" test which in Mak justifies treating all cases alike. As Carl-
son and National Center make clear, courts should carefully review the
Attorney General's denial by regulation of an individualized hearing
and should consider whether other legally significant elements -
such as the presence or absence of children, or changes in the alien
spouse's life and property arrangements in reasonable reliance on
that thereafter he would not allow bail to any alien against whom deportation pro-
ceedings were started and who was then a member of the Communist Party - an
undiscriminating, unindividualized class determination - it would disregard the
clear directive of Congress for this Court not to hold that the Attorney General had
exceeded the limits of his discretion. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. at 558 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
743 F.2d at 1371.
72. Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d at 730. Cf Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248, 250-
251 (5th Cir. 1981) ("only a clear showing of a contrary intent by Congress will justify
overruling the agency's regulations").
495
Yale Law & Policy Review
the marriage promises - warrant a difference in treatment. In di-
vorce and petition withdrawal cases, different treatment is
necessary.
Moreover, statutory interpretation is a question of law. It is ulti-
mately the responsibility of the judiciary, not the agency, to deter-
mine such questions. Thus, when reviewing an agency's application
of a statute to a particular case which the INS has decided by regula-
tion, the courts give some deference to the agency's interpretation
but must decide upon their own reading of the statute.
In Leano v. INS, 73 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Service's denial,
pursuant to a regulation similar to the automatic revocation regula-
tions,74 of an application for adjustment of status. The Service con-
ducted an inquiry into the alien's application which took over eleven
months. In the meantime, the petitioner, the alien's U.S.-citizen fa-
ther, died, triggering automatic revocation. In its one-page per
curiam decision, the Ninth Circuit exercised its power to review de
novo and summarily ordered the Service to reconsider the revoca-
tion. Rejecting the Service's reliance on its regulation, the court
simply stated that the Service should have used "with propriety" the
discretionary power conferred by the adjustment of status statute
and the approval revocation statute. 75 While the Service has broad
discretion to apply the Act, whatever standard it uses and whether it
articulates that standard or not, the courts still have the ultimate
duty to make sure that the Service is applying the Act properly. If,
as in the area of divorce and petition withdrawal, the Service misap-
plies the statute to a given fact pattern, the court should conclude




The problem with the automatic regulations is not only statutory;
it is also constitutional. "From its founding the Nation's basic com-
73. Leano v. INS, 460 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). At the time, on death
of the petitioner after approval of the petition, the Service would revoke the petition
automatically if the visa had not yet been issued. Here, almost a year had gone by since
approval. The court of appeals held that under the "unusual circumstances," "the strict
position taken by the Service was not required." Unfortunately, the court did not elabo-
rate on this observation in its one-page decision. Currently, the regulations provide for
the Service's exercise of some discretion before revocation in death-of-petitioner cases.
See 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(1986) and infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
74. See also Pierno v. INS, 397 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Stellas v.
Esperdy, 388 U.S. 462 (1967).
75. Leano v. INS, 460 F.2d at 1260.




mitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders."' 77 Constitutional review of regulations on due
process grounds involves a balancing of private and governmental
interests. The Supreme Court described this balancing in Mathews
v. Eldridge:
"Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circum-
stance,"[citations omitted]. . . . Accordingly, resolution of the issue
whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitution-
ally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private inter-
ests that are affected. [citations omitted]. . . . More precisely, our
prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of
due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.7
8
The automatic revocation regulations violate the fundamentals of
due process by denying notice and a hearing to the alien. 79 They
also deny due process to U.S. citizens: the U.S. parent and the U.S.-
born children. The parent may be deprived of state family law pro-
tection and constitutional privacy rights. The children, in turn, may
be deprived of their interests in being raised by both parents (even
if separated) and in growing up within the American cultural milieu,
as well as their right to economic support.
77. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-265 (1970) (emphasis added) (constitu-
tional challenge to termination, without prior hearing, of financial aid under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program).
78. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (constitutional challenge to
termination of Social Security disability payments without prior hearing).
79. Early in the history of immigration regulation, the Supreme Court set the mini-
mum standards of fairness and due process:
But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that
administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the lib-
erty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due pro-
cess of law' as understood at the time of adoption of the Constitution. One of these
principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at
some time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon which
that liberty depends - not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occasion,
and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure the
prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the same time be appro-
priate to the nature of the case upon which such officers are required to act.
Japanese Immigration Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1903). See also Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33 (1950); Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
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Without a hearing before the INS, alien parents (and therefore
the U.S.-citizen parents and children) have no forum in which to
raise the traditional personal defenses of duress, misinformation, er-
ror, illegality or other possible defects in the grounds for the revoca-
tion.80 It is true that prior to expulsion aliens may be heard in
deportation or exclusion proceedings. Yet this is an empty right for
aliens being deported on the basis of the automatic revocation regu-
lations, since they may not attack the grounds for the revocation in
those proceedings. Because the regulations are mandatory and au-
tomatic, the reasons for the withdrawal or divorce are deemed im-
material for purposes of deportation. Worse yet, an immigration
judge's refusal to consider such reasons has been found to be unre-
viewable in federal court.8 '
This denial of a hearing constitutes a plain violation of the due
process clause under the Mathews v. Eldridge test. First, the private
interests potentially affected are clear. They involve the most basic
family values. Some have been recognized as individual rights by
statute and common law. Others have constitutional protection.8 2
Second, there is the highest possible risk of erroneous deprivation
of these interests, since the INS, without a hearing, may never learn
of the needs of the children of the alien spouse and the U.S. citizen.
Concomitantly, the probable value of the additional procedural
safeguard of a hearing is extremely high in that it would provide the
INS with the information necessary to exercise its discretion on a
80. Cf 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.3(a), 103.5(a)(c)(1)(1986). These two regulations contain
the general standards to be followed in immigration proceedings. As opposed to the
automatic revocation regulations, they carefully define rights regarding notice proce-
dures, the opportunity to be heard and the appeal process in most other situations with
which the INS deals.
81. Because the circumstances surrounding withdrawal cannot be raised in a depor-
tation proceeding, they become a "collateral issue" on appeal. At least one court has
found that this precluded consideration of those circumstances during review of a de-
portation order. De Figueroa v. INS, 501 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1974).
82. The Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental, constitutionally protected
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life." Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-
153 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 502-503 (White,
J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-544, 549-553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). Furthermore, administrative policies that implicate personal rights or inter-
ests, just as legislative policies that do, are subject to intense due process scrutiny and
substantive review by the courts. In the review process, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized important privacy and family rights derived from the Constitution. See, e.g., Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Administrative actions affecting mere economic rights are also subject to constitutional
scrutiny, but enjoy a stronger presumption of regularity. See, e.g., Pacific States Box &




factually complete record. Third, a hearing would neither inhibit
the pursuit of government interests nor create a burden on the gov-
ernment. The government's interest in discouraging sham mar-
riages is already well served by pre-approval investigation and
interview methods, so the automatic regulations do not even mar-
ginally add to the advancement of that interest. Further, in light of
the large volume of INS hearings, hearings in divorce and petition
withdrawal cases would not increase the agency's fiscal and adminis-
trative burden. There are relatively few such cases. The INS itself
does not consider the added burden a significant factor in its deci-
sion to keep the revocation regulations.
83
Although the automatic revocation regulations are open to seri-
ous due process attack,84 research has disclosed only one deporta-
tion case, Wright v. INS,85 in which a court was directly faced with a
due process challenge. But in Wright, rather than address the consti-
tutional issue, the Sixth Circuit accepted without inquiry the Attor-
ney General's "opinion," constructively expressed in the automatic
revocation regulation, that "good and sufficient cause" existed for
revocation.8 6 Such extreme judicial deference is in actuality an ab-
dication of judicial duty.8 7 While it is true that the scope of judicial
inquiry into immigration legislation is limited, a federal court
should not give deference to Congress' or the Executive's interpre-
tation of constitutional mandates if it finds compelling indications
that the interpretation is wrong.88 Moreover, against a constitu-
83. See supra notes 52-53.
84. GORDON & ROSENFIELD, 1 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 3.5i, 3-60.9
(1985).
85. 379 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928 (1967).
86. Id. In its brief per curiam decision, the Court devoted ten lines to the issue.
Without even discussing the standard or test to be used, the Court held that the due
process requirement was satisfied because "[t]he regulations do not provide for a hear-
ing on either the approval or revocation of a petition." Id. at 276. In support of this
proposition, the Court limited itself to citing United States ex ret. Stellas v. Esperdy, 366
F.2d 266, Pacheco Pereira v. INS, 342 F.2d 422, and Scalzo v. Hurney, 225 F. Supp. 560.
However, the decision in Wright cannot be defended on the basis of stare decisis because
unlike Wright, (1) Stellas was grounded in an exclusion proceeding where no constitu-
tional due process is required, (2) Pacheco Pereira involved a petition which had not yet
been approved, thereby leaving 8 C.F.R. § 205.1 untriggered, and (3) Scalzo dealt with
the statute and not with the regulation.
87. "The Constitution has imposed upon this Court final authority to determine the
meaning and application of those words of that instrument which require interpretation
to resolve judicial issues." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946), and cases
cited therein.
88. In resolving regulatory issues, the courts are guided "by the venerable principle
that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed
unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong .... " Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
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tional challenge, regulatory action deserves less deference than con-
gressional action.8 9 Yet instead of pursuing an independent review
of the constitutional validity of the regulations, the Sixth Circuit in
Wright upheld them on the simple basis that the Attorney General
had promulgated and applied the regulation in question. Unfortu-
nately, the court expressly relied on the confused decisions in
Pacheco Pereira v. INS and Scalzo v. Hurney and the Second Circuit's
decision in United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy.90 Whereas the mis-
guided analysis of Pacheco Pereira hampered the future development
of case law at the statutory level, the Wright court compounded the
problem by elevating to a constitutional due process level the confusion
that those decisions had created. 9'
V. An Alternative to Automatic Revocation: The "Humanitarian
Reasons" Procedure
During the 1960's, in cases where the petitioner died after ap-
proval but before visa issuance, the INS operated under an auto-
matic revocation regulation 92 similar to the revocation regulations
for the case of petition withdrawal or divorce. The harshness of this
automatic revocation provision was limited in Pierno v. INS.93 When
Mr. Pierno, a U.S. citizen, died eight months after approval of the
petition for his alien wife, the INS denied her application for adjust-
ment of status and found her deportable. Rather than blindly up-
holding the automatic revocation, the Second Circuit vacated the
INS's order and remanded for further proceedings. 94 Relying both
on the dissent from its prior decision in Stellas and on the fact that
the Supreme Court vacated the majority decision in that case, the
court refused to apply the regulation in a way that would frustrate
the congressional intent to include some amount of discretion in the
89. In situations in which "the arbitrary and capricious standard requires no more
than the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under
the Due Process Clause," the same standard will require more from an administrative
rule. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
n.9 (1983).
90. Wright v. INS was decided onJune 22, 1967, ten days after the Supreme Court's
reversal of the Second Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy. Mrs.
Wright's petition for certiorari was denied. There is no record of a petition for rehear-
ing to the Sixth Circuit.
91. G. CALABRESI, COMMON LAW COURTS IN THE AGE OF STATUTES (1985). By up-
holding the regulation against a constitutional challenge, the Wright decision compli-
cated the problem in that it increased the political cost, its "inertia" in Calabresian
terms, of modifying the regulation.
92. 8 C.F.R. § 206.1(a)(4) (1957), now 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(2)(1986).





approval revocation process.9 5
By 1976 the INS recognized the importance of not treating all
death-of-petitioner cases alike. It amended the regulation to allow
for discretion while still placing a heavy burden on the applicant. As
amended, the regulation now provides that automatic revocation
will take place "upon the death of the petitioner unless the Attorney
General in his discretion determines that for humanitarian reasons revocation
would be inappropriate. 96 This provision allows for the exercise of lim-
ited discretion on a case-by-case basis, thus permitting flexibility in
application. On occasion, an actual hearing will be necessary. In
other situations, the case may be decided on written submissions,
such as a brief and adequate affidavit and documentary evidence.
97
Further, the heavy burden on the applicant which is embodied in the
"humanitarian reasons" standard discourages frivolous cases. 98 Fi-
nally, the INS has never reported that the amendment of the death-
of-petitioner regulation increased its caseload or impaired its ability
to attend to its other obligations within its budgetary constraints.
The discretion reserved to the INS in the death-of-petitioner reg-
ulation may serve as a guide to fashion the type of discretion the
INS could reserve to itself in withdrawal and divorce cases.99 The
95. Id. The court placed some emphasis on the fact that several months had gone by
as a result of a stay in the administrative proceeding necessitated by an ongoing state
court action. Id. However, an eight month wait is not uncommon. More important was
the court's finding that the statute requires individualized hearings.
96. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(1986)(emphasis added).
97. As a rule, the INS is staffed with highly experienced hearing examiners. If a
remedy is available, they are generally not averse to granting it in appropriate cases.
Furthermore, there is always judicial review of adjudicatory decisions.
98. The "humanitarian reasons" standard of discretion is definitely not a "bright
line" standard. As such, it is subject to strong criticism, including the charge that it does
not conform to the highest ideals of due process. This author believes, based on his
limited experience, that "humanitarian reasons" means the opposite of "economic rea-
sons." One can find many references to these terms in the area of suspension of depor-
tation relief. By itself, mere economic hardship imposed upon the alien or his or her
family by deportation is not enough to suspend the deportation proceeding and adjust
the alien's status. Of much greater weight are factors such as family ties in the United
States, length of stay in the country, health problems in the family that cannot be treated
abroad, career loss for the alien's spouse and cultural acclimatization of the alien and
children. These are a case's "equities" and on occasion are collectively referred to as
the humanitarian considerations. Together with considerations based on the length of
time between petition approval and petitioner's death and the circumstances that cre-
ated such delay, these equities would constitute the pertinent "humanitarian reasons."
See, e.g., Pierno v. INS, 397 F.2d 949 (annulment action brought by beneficiary's stepson
provoked an unusually long investigation period); Leano v. INS, 460 F.2d 1260 (consul
delayed response to INS inquiry for over eleven months).
99. The "humanitarian reasons" standard is a flexible one. As applied, it tends to
give greater weight to the potential hardships related to family ties, health, and cultural
factors than to economic hardship. In general, this is an acceptable distinction because
most, if not all, immigration cases present one form or another of economic hardship.
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revocation would take place unless the applicant met the burden of
proving that revocation would be inappropriate for humanitarian
reasons. Providing this relatively inexpensive and informal forum at
the administrative level would remove, to a large extent,'0 0 the infir-
mities of due process and abuse of discretion which afflict the cur-
rent regulations. The "humanitarian reasons" amendment would
also promote the following policies: (1) the equities in the case
would be heard in the first instance not by federal judges, but by
INS officers and family law judges who are more experienced in the
area;' 0 ' (2) the government would drastically reduce the risk of hav-
ing the couple's children become public charges; (3) the govern-
ment would help reduce overall litigation costs by disposing of
many cases at the administrative level; and (4) the federal govern-
ment would no longer unwittingly help citizens dodge state family
law obligations.
VI. Conclusion
The regulations providing for automatic revocation of approval
on petition withdrawal or divorce foreclose administrative consider-
ation both of the interests and equities of all the members of the
family, including the U.S. citizens, and of the reasons for the with-
drawal or divorce. They do not advance the proffered objective of
reducing fraudulent marriage cases. In issuing the regulations,
the Attorney General abused his statutory discretion and unconsti-
tutionally denied due process to U.S. citizens and aliens. As a con-
sequence, he hampered important policies underlying the
constitutional protections and the bar on abuse of discretion. A
"humanitarian reasons" exception to the regulation would solve the
Thus, economic hardship alone cannot be determinative in individual cases involving
discretion.
100. Two relevant issues are not considered in the presentation of the "humanita-
rian reasons" alternative: (1) whether the statutory burden of showing "good and suffi-
cient cause" is on the Attorney General or the applicant, and (2) whether the
administrative decision of accepting only "humanitarian reasons" - as opposed to
(more obscurely yet) "non-humanitarian reasons" - in the process of determining good
and sufficient cause is in itself so restrictive as to amount to abuse of discretion or in-
fringement of constitutionally protected rights. However, since (1) the Service, once it
does hear a case, usually considers and safeguards the interests of all the individuals
involved adequately, and (2) imposing a heavier burden on the Service might begin to
weaken its capacity for speedy and economical disposition of cases, the "humanitarian
reasons" alternative is the best policy solution given the current budgetary allocation.
101. Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 CoLUM. L. REV.





current shortcomings without decreasing the current effectiveness
of the Service or requiring an increase in its budget.
- Guillermo Gleizer
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